Britain is paying billions because electricity generation has been allowed to develop faster than the grid needed to carry it. This is not merely a complaint from people questioning Government energy policy. It is a central problem identified by Parliament’s spending watchdog, the National Audit Office.
Its September 2026 examination of Britain’s electricity transmission programme recorded a disturbing combination: no single point of accountability for the portfolio’s overall progress and value for money; no complete programme-level comparison of the costs and alternatives across generation and transmission; and a history of new generation connecting before enough network capacity was available.
And the consequence is already appearing in the electricity system’s costs. The NAO reported £1.9 billion in thermal constraint costs in 2025–26. The electricity system sometimes has to reduce generation in one place and increase generation elsewhere because the existing network cannot carry all the power to where it is needed.
Ofgem estimates approximately £70 billion of electricity transmission investment between 2025 and 2031. This is not the same as a complete lifetime bill, and the NAO has not said that the upgrades are unnecessary. But it has found that the overall portfolio’s value-for-money case was not demonstrated through a comprehensive appraisal of alternatives.
How did Britain reach the point of paying to manage a network mismatch while committing tens of billions more to catch up? And who is responsible for correcting it? Those questions went directly to the Public Accounts Committee on 22 October 2026.
THE NAO’S FINDING: WHERE WAS THE WHOLE-SYSTEM PLAN?
Individual transmission projects can be scrutinised and approved by regulators, yet the complete collection of projects may still deserve a separate and rigorous comparison against alternative system designs. The NAO found that no single organisation had maintained a fully integrated view of generation and transmission costs, options and trade-offs.
The NAO acknowledged the need for new infrastructure and the risk of higher costs if it is delayed. But the need to invest in a grid does not mean every proposed route, development sequence and assumed generation mix has been shown to be the least-cost choice. Those are different propositions, and Parliament should insist that the difference is explained.
WHY WE SUBMITTED EVIDENCE TO PARLIAMENT
On 15 October 2026 our submission, CPU0002, was published by the Public Accounts Committee. It called for clear programme-wide accountability, a transparent project-by-project ledger, deliverable construction dates, lifetime consumer costs and a fair comparison with alternative electricity-system designs.
The purpose was not to argue against maintaining and modernising Britain’s grid. It was to challenge the assumption that a timetable set around preferred energy targets was, by itself, proof of engineering feasibility, affordability or necessity. Britain’s electricity system must be designed around reliable supply, winter demand, security, realistic construction schedules and the prices households and industries can afford.
CLIVE BETTS: IF THE INFORMATION EXISTS, WHY CAN’T THE PUBLIC SEE IT QUARTERLY?
Clive Betts pressed the witnesses to publish quarterly progress reports on major transmission projects, including delays, problems and action to put them right. Ofgem described an intended consolidated public report, with the first expected in February 2027, and a proposed annual publication cycle.
The revealing admission was that quarterly internal scrutiny and monthly reporting arrangements already existed. The committee was not given a firm commitment to make comparable project-level information public every quarter.
For infrastructure that can slip by months or years, an annual public account can arrive long after an emerging problem becomes difficult to correct. Betts was asking for more than reassurance: he wanted Parliament to see warning signals while action was still possible.
THE CAR CRASH QUESTION: CAN OFGEM PREVENT FAILURE OR ONLY PENALISE IT?
Chris Kane challenged Ofgem Chief Executive Tim Jarvis over intervention powers when a transmission project appears to be heading towards failure. Kane’s memorable car crash analogy cut through the administrative language: what can the regulator actually do when it sees the danger developing?
Jarvis explained that Ofgem is not a passive observer. It scrutinises projects, monitors risks, challenges network companies and can apply financial consequences. That is an important response. Yet the hearing did not establish a clear mechanism to take control of a major project and ensure delivery before a critical deadline is missed.
A penalty does not manufacture a transformer. It does not recover a lost construction season or instantly secure a planning consent. The question Parliament should press is not whether Ofgem receives reports, but what effective intervention follows when the reports show a serious risk of failure.
RUPERT LOWE PRESSES NESO: WHERE IS THE ACTUAL ACCELERATION?
Rupert Lowe questioned NESO Chief Executive Fintan Slye on whether reforms to the electricity connections queue had translated into projects actually moving forward. Slye described the work removing speculative or stalled projects from the queue, while acknowledging that relatively few connection dates had been brought forward.
Those are not the same outcome. Removing unready applications can improve the integrity of the queue; it does not, by itself, complete the substations, cables and transformers needed for the projects that remain.
Administrative progress must be reported separately from physical progress. The public needs to know which schemes have genuinely advanced, which still depend on future grid construction and what the resulting timetable means for consumers.
EIGHT TO TEN YEARS TO BUILD — SO WHY WAS GENERATION ALLOWED TO RACE AHEAD?
Tim Jarvis acknowledged that major electricity transmission projects can take eight to ten years, while generation may be brought online sooner. Emily Bourne of DESNZ identified three East Anglian projects — the two parts of Norwich–Tilbury and Sea Link — that had not proved possible to accelerate to the desired 2030 dates.
This is not a small scheduling discrepancy. If essential network construction lags the generation programme, it can contribute to congestion and further balancing expenditure. The authorities are entitled to argue that accelerating transmission saves money compared with allowing that mismatch to persist. But a crucial comparison remains: what would it have cost to coordinate the commissioning of generation and grid capacity more effectively from the outset?
THE £7.8 BILLION WARNING — AND WHY THE BASELINE MATTERS
The NAO recorded NESO modelling suggesting annual constraint costs could reach roughly £6.6 billion to £7.8 billion by 2030 if important network upgrades are not accelerated. These are modelled scenarios, not an expenditure total already incurred. They also include costs of increasing generation elsewhere, not simply payments to wind farms to reduce output.
During the hearing, MPs pressed NESO on the modelling and on measures such as dynamic line rating intended to improve use of the existing network. The criticism is not that constraint costs are invented. It is that policymakers must show the public updated figures and explain how different generation timetables, locations and network investment choices change the result.
If the comparison assumes all planned renewable generation proceeds while infrastructure falls behind, the case for emergency acceleration will look strong. The public should also see a genuinely like-for-like assessment of an alternative in which generation construction is matched to deliverable network capacity.
YOUR TRANSMISSION CHARGES: £44 BECOMING £104
The NAO reported Ofgem’s forecast that the typical household’s annual contribution to onshore electricity transmission would rise from approximately £44 in 2025–26 to £104 in 2030–31. This is one part of the electricity bill, not the whole bill.
Ofgem projects that faster upgrades could still save the typical household roughly £30 a year in 2030–31 compared with a slower-upgrade scenario, through lower constraint and related costs. That is a modelled comparison, not a guarantee that actual bills fall by £30 compared with today.
Consumers deserve the complete account: what is invested, what is recovered in permitted network revenues, what financing and returns add over decades, what congestion costs remain and what alternative programmes would cost under comparable assumptions.
WHO OWNS THE TOTAL BILL?
Jonathan Brearley, Permanent Secretary at DESNZ, acknowledged the department’s ultimate responsibility. But the NAO’s finding was more specific: no single point of accountability had been established for the complete programme’s progress and value for money. NESO plans the system, Ofgem regulates, DESNZ sets policy and network companies construct the assets.
Each can explain its function. Parliament needs someone who can explain the complete system: its costs, dependencies, risks, corrective action and options for reducing the burden on consumers. The larger and more interconnected the undertaking, the more important that responsibility becomes.
THE COUNTRYSIDE CANNOT BE LEFT OUT OF THE ACCOUNT
The costs are not confined to network charges. Communities face substations, high-voltage lines, access roads, solar developments and batteries across farmland and countryside. Some of that infrastructure may be justified, but every scheme should be assessed in the context of the network on which it depends and the alternatives available.
Our examination of projects around Thorpe Marsh, Brinsworth, Whitestone and Tween Bridge shows why a proposed connection date must not be confused with a verified delivery date for every enabling network asset. Construction dependencies must be made transparent before planning and investment decisions are made.
NO MORE ASSURANCES: PUBLISH THE EVIDENCE
Parliament should demand quarterly public reporting on critical transmission schemes: current capital forecasts, planned and expected completion dates, physical construction milestones, enabling works, network outages, key dependencies, risks and corrective action. Ofgem should explain exactly how and when it can intervene before failure. DESNZ and NESO should publish a common-assumption comparison of alternative generation-and-grid designs and their lifetime consumer costs.
The witnesses were right that this is an exceptionally complex undertaking. But complexity is the reason to demand rigorous early planning and transparent management — not a substitute for them. Britain has already paid billions to manage a mismatch between generation and its network. Before committing billions more, the authorities must demonstrate that the next stage is properly coordinated, affordable and deliverable.
MAKE THEM SHOW THE EVIDENCE.
SOURCE DOCUMENTS AND RECORDING
National Audit Office — Upgrading the Electricity Transmission Network (September 2026)
Public Accounts Committee — 22 October 2026 hearing and video
Automated transcript — Parallel Parliament (check against video for exact wording)
Published written evidence CPU0002 — Shane Oxer
Evidence note: Spoken exchanges are paraphrased from the available automated transcript and parliamentary recording. The official corrected transcript, when published, should be used to check exact quotations. The critical analysis is the author’s interpretation of the cited findings and testimony.
MAKE THEM SHOW THE EVIDENCE — SIGN THE PETITION
Britain’s electricity future must be supported by published, independently testable evidence on engineering feasibility, costs, alternatives and consequences for consumers. Support the call for transparency.
SIGN PARLIAMENTARY PETITION 780321 — MAKE THEM SHOW THE EVIDENCE
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