Billions committed. Electricity prices among the highest in the developed world. Industry struggling to compete. Grid construction falling behind. And the National Audit Office says the government has not demonstrated that its selected infrastructure programme is the best way forward.
Britain is undertaking one of the most expensive reconstructions of its electricity system in generations.
New wind farms, vast solar developments, battery installations, overhead transmission lines, substations and supporting infrastructure are being planned and constructed across the country. The government describes this as a transition towards cleaner, cheaper and more secure electricity.
But there is a fundamental question that deserves an answer before still more money is committed and still more countryside is transformed.
Who has demonstrated that this enormous reconstruction will deliver a more affordable, dependable electricity system than Britain could have achieved by retaining, upgrading and extending its existing infrastructure?
The department responsible for answering that question is the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero — DESNZ. And at the top of that department sits Jonathan Brearley.
His career connects the original legislation that established Britain’s binding climate-policy framework, the regulator overseeing the transformation of the electricity market, and the government department now responsible for delivering the programme. That history makes the question of accountability particularly important.
BRITAIN BUILT ITS ELECTRICITY SYSTEM TO PROVIDE POWER — NOT TO SATISFY A POLITICAL TARGET
Britain’s national electricity system was one of the country’s great engineering achievements. The original National Grid entered commercial operation in 1935. During the 1950s and 1960s, engineers developed the supergrid to meet rapidly expanding electricity demand.
They had to decide where generating stations should be located, how electricity should be transmitted, how much dependable generating capacity was needed and how the system would remain stable when equipment failed or demand increased.
In 1950, engineers working for the British Electricity Authority calculated that transporting electricity from generating stations near the coalfields would be cheaper than transporting equivalent quantities of coal to power stations closer to consumers. That economic and engineering assessment helped shape the 275 kV supergrid.
The system was also designed to accommodate later improvements, including the introduction of 400 kV transmission. These were not decisions based solely on aspirations. They were engineering and economic choices directed towards supplying electricity reliably and efficiently.
Britain invested enormous sums in the resulting infrastructure. Generating stations, substations, transmission routes and control systems were built, maintained and improved over successive decades. Those investments became national assets with substantial economic value.
Some have since reached the end of their lives. Others remain operational and useful. The grid itself continues to serve Britain. The issue is not whether ageing infrastructure ever needs replacing.
The issue is whether government has properly established the economic case for reconstructing so much of the electricity system around a predetermined emissions timetable rather than first determining Britain’s most affordable and dependable energy requirements.
THE TARGET CAME FIRST — THE ENGINEERING PROGRAMME HAD TO FOLLOW
The origins of Britain’s current energy policy lie in the Climate Change Act 2008. That legislation established binding emissions-reduction obligations and five-year carbon budgets. Its original 2050 requirement was subsequently increased to Net Zero in 2019.
The legislation was developed through climate-policy analysis, economic modelling and political decision-making. But a legally binding emissions target is not an engineering specification for a functioning electricity system.
It does not establish where generating stations should be built, which existing assets should remain operational, what reserve capacity must be retained, how much transmission reinforcement is required or whether the entire programme can be delivered affordably. Those questions require detailed engineering and economic analysis.
The distinction becomes particularly clear in the government’s Clean Power 2030 programme. The political commitment to clean electricity by 2030 was established before the government commissioned NESO, in August 2024, to advise on how that objective could be achieved.
NESO undertook substantial technical analysis. Its engineers examined electricity demand, network capacity, generation, storage and security of supply. But they were being asked to identify a route towards an existing political objective, not an unrestricted commission to determine which future system would meet Britain’s physical requirements at the lowest overall cost regardless of emissions targets.
When government determines the destination first, the engineering programme becomes responsible for finding a way to reach it. The cost of achieving the objective does not disappear simply because the objective has been written into policy.
The essential public question is whether the chosen route has been compared properly with alternative systems built around affordability, dependable generation, existing assets and national energy security.
JONATHAN BREARLEY: FROM THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACT TO OFGEM TO DESNZ
The career of Jonathan Brearley provides an extraordinary connection between the origins of modern British climate legislation and the institutions now administering its implementation.
His official government biography confirms that, as Head of the Office of Climate Change, he led the development of the Climate Change Act. He subsequently held senior responsibilities for electricity-market reform at the Department of Energy and Climate Change.
In February 2020, he became Chief Executive of Ofgem. During his six years leading the regulator, Britain experienced the energy-supplier crisis, exceptional increases in energy prices and major changes to regulatory arrangements governing electricity infrastructure.
Ofgem also oversaw regulatory changes enabling the acceleration of electricity transmission investment and the establishment of the National Energy System Operator.
In March 2026, Brearley became Permanent Secretary at DESNZ.
He helped develop legislation establishing binding climate objectives. He subsequently led the regulator overseeing major parts of the electricity system’s transformation. He now heads the government department responsible for national energy policy and the delivery of Net Zero.
Brearley did not personally create DESNZ, which was established by government in February 2023. Nor did he alone determine the Climate Change Act’s provisions or enact the legislation. But the continuity of his involvement in these institutions is undeniable.
His professional history places him at significant stages in the development, regulation and administration of Britain’s climate-policy framework. It does not establish personal responsibility for every subsequent cost or decision. It does make him particularly well placed to explain whether the original policy assumptions have been tested against what Britain has subsequently experienced.
What electricity costs were anticipated? What alternative generation and infrastructure arrangements were evaluated? What lessons emerged during his leadership of Ofgem? And how are those lessons influencing DESNZ today?
The public should be entitled to answers that extend beyond the defence of an existing policy.
Source: Jonathan Brearley — official government biography.
DESNZ ADMITS THE RESPONSIBILITY STOPS WITH THE DEPARTMENT
On 22 October 2026, Jonathan Brearley appeared before the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee alongside representatives of Ofgem and NESO. The committee examined Clean Power 2030 and the infrastructure programme intended to deliver it.
MPs challenged the division of responsibility between government, regulators, system planners and transmission companies. Who was responsible if projects were delayed? Who was responsible for the cost of those delays? And who would ultimately answer if the entire programme failed to deliver as intended?
In the available live hearing transcript, Brearley acknowledged the department’s overarching role: “Ultimately the department is accountable.” He explained that DESNZ sets policy and strategy, while Ofgem and NESO have their own responsibilities. He subsequently stated: “Ultimately accountability rests with us.”
These words are from the available live transcript at approximately 10:07–10:08am; verify against the final corrected parliamentary transcript when it becomes available.
That acknowledgement is significant. DESNZ sets national direction. Ofgem regulates major aspects of infrastructure investment and consumer protections. NESO manages electricity-system operations and recommends strategic network development. Private transmission companies construct and maintain the physical network.
The department cannot reasonably claim credit for the transformation’s promised benefits while treating the combined financial consequences as somebody else’s responsibility. It must demonstrate how the complete programme is intended to deliver reliable and affordable electricity.
DESNZ, Ofgem and NESO witnesses before the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, 22 October 2026. Photograph from the existing site media library.
Source: Public Accounts Committee — 22 October 2026 hearing.
£40 BILLION A YEAR: THE SCALE OF THE GOVERNMENT’S ENERGY AMBITION
The government’s Clean Power 2030 Action Plan estimates approximately £40 billion of investment annually between 2025 and 2030. Much is expected from private companies, but private investment is not free to electricity consumers.
Generation projects and transmission infrastructure require capital. Investors must recover their costs through electricity markets, regulated charges or contracts. The effect on consumers depends on how investments perform, their revenue arrangements and what savings they create elsewhere in the system.
The government’s technical annex explains that the annual investment estimate covers generation and transmission assets but excludes some financing and operating costs. Infrastructure must also be operated, maintained and eventually replaced. Backup, storage and system balancing have to be considered.
A new power station is not automatically an economic improvement simply because it contributes to an emissions target. A new transmission line is not automatically the best investment simply because it helps deliver a predetermined generation programme.
Those decisions should be justified by transparent comparisons with credible alternatives, including the economic value of assets Britain already owns.
Source: Clean Power 2030 Action Plan and technical annex.
£70 BILLION FOR TRANSMISSION — YET THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THE SELECTED PROGRAMME IS BEST
The National Audit Office’s September 2026 investigation identified a programme of approximately £70 billion of electricity-transmission investment between 2025 and 2031, estimated by Ofgem. This overlaps with the wider Clean Power programme and must not be added to the £40 billion annual investment estimate as though wholly separate.
The money will fund transmission routes, cables, substations and network reinforcements. Some projects respond to genuine network limitations, and suitable improvements can reduce the costs of grid congestion.
But the NAO reported that most of the projects NESO recommended were selected from schemes already under development. Critically, it found that without an integrated plan or whole-system appraisal, government had not demonstrated that the selected projects were the best way of achieving its objectives.
This is a significant gap in the evidence for a programme of such financial magnitude.
Would different locations for generation reduce expensive reinforcement? Could more existing infrastructure be retained or upgraded? Could additional nuclear or gas generation in appropriate locations reduce particular network requirements? What happens to costs when construction is delayed?
The government should have convincing answers before committing the country to the complete programme — not simply explanations of why individual projects are necessary once the preferred strategy has been chosen.
Major transmission infrastructure has physical and landscape consequences as well as financial costs. Pylons near Huntshaw, North Devon; photograph from the existing site media library.
Source: National Audit Office — Upgrading the Electricity Transmission Network.
£1.9 BILLION PAID BECAUSE ELECTRICITY COULD NOT REACH WHERE IT WAS NEEDED
When electricity cannot be transferred through the transmission system without overloading network circuits, NESO must intervene. This can mean paying some generators to reduce output and paying others, including gas-fired stations, to increase output elsewhere.
The NAO recorded £1.9 billion in electricity-transmission constraint costs in 2025/26. It warned that annual costs could reach £7.8 billion by 2030 without effective action. That upper figure is a projected risk, not expenditure already incurred.
These payments are not all made to wind farms. Costs can arise from obtaining replacement generation as well as reducing output from constrained plants. But the underlying issue is clear: generation and transmission capacity must be developed in a coherent sequence.
The NAO also found that a number of infrastructure projects were unlikely to be complete by originally identified optimal dates and that some new generation could connect before the reinforcements needed to transport its output.
Ofgem argues that accelerating appropriate network projects can save consumers money compared with permitting those delays. That provides evidence in favour of timely upgrades. It does not establish that the original combination and geography of generation and infrastructure were the lowest-cost choice.
Would Britain have incurred the same scale of congestion and reinforcement costs under an alternative, demand-led generation strategy? That is the comparison DESNZ should demonstrate.
BRITISH HOUSEHOLDS ARE PAYING HIGH PRICES WHILE CHEAPER ENERGY REMAINS A PROMISE
The Institute for Fiscal Studies reported in September 2026 that British household electricity prices had risen by approximately 147% since 2010, compared with 63% general consumer-price inflation.
Business electricity prices increased by approximately 174%, compared with a 76% increase in average producer input prices. Britain has some of the highest electricity prices in the developed world.
International gas-market price increases are a major part of this story, especially since 2021. The figures cannot all be attributed to climate policy. Yet policy charges, support contracts and infrastructure costs also matter, and governments must account for their effects.
For October–December 2026, Ofgem’s typical annual domestic energy price cap is £1,723. Combined household energy debt and arrears outstanding for more than 91 days reached £5.02 billion in the second quarter of 2026.
That debt is not a direct measurement of Net Zero expenditure, but it illustrates the financial pressures experienced by consumers.
An energy strategy must demonstrate value throughout its implementation, not simply promise a cheaper destination at the end of an expensive journey.
Source: IFS — Electricity Prices. Ofgem — Debt and Arrears.
BRITISH INDUSTRY CANNOT COMPETE ON PROMISES OF FUTURE CHEAP ELECTRICITY
For manufacturing, electricity prices influence investment decisions, production and employment. Steel, chemicals and other energy-intensive activities need dependable electricity at internationally competitive prices.
In October 2026, UK Steel reported illustrative electricity costs of approximately £84 per megawatt-hour for British steel producers, compared with £48 in France and £65 in Germany. On those figures, the difference against France was around £36 per megawatt-hour.
UK Steel estimated a corresponding annual cost disadvantage of around £82 million for British producers against French electricity prices. Market arrangements, industrial exemptions, taxes and generation mixes influence these comparisons. France’s substantial nuclear generating fleet is one relevant factor.
Energy costs are not the only obstacle facing British manufacturing. Trade conditions, taxes, demand, wages and global competition also matter. Nevertheless, expensive electricity is a documented disadvantage.
What is the value of an energy transition if Britain cannot supply the internationally competitive power needed to sustain and expand its own manufacturing base?
Source: UK Steel — October 2026 industrial electricity analysis.
DESNZ: £852 MILLION IN STAFF COSTS AND £244 MILLION IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
DESNZ’s 2025/26 audited accounts show £852 million in staff costs across its departmental group and £244 million in legal, professional and consultancy expenditure.
Those figures cover the wider group, including nuclear, research, decommissioning and other bodies. They cannot all be classified as the cost of renewable electricity or Net Zero policymaking.
The accounts also show a group net-liability position of approximately £228.9 billion at 31 March 2026, including long-term obligations and accounting valuations. Changes in the recognition of Contracts for Difference liabilities materially influenced the position. This is not a cash amount already spent by taxpayers, nor a single Net Zero bill.
But large commitments and financial exposures make transparent evaluation of future costs and risks especially important.
The greater the financial commitment, the stronger the obligation to demonstrate what it buys, how risks are managed and whether a better alternative exists.
Source: DESNZ Annual Report and Accounts 2025/26.
A DEPARTMENT OVERSEEING BILLIONS FAILED TO MEET ITS BOARD-MEETING REQUIREMENT
DESNZ’s 2025/26 annual report acknowledges that its departmental board met only twice during the financial year, below the central-government governance requirement for quarterly board meetings.
Other oversight continued, including meetings of the executive and audit arrangements. It would be inaccurate to claim that the department exercised oversight only twice. Brearley also joined DESNZ near the end of that reporting year, so the earlier shortfall cannot fairly be attributed to his tenure.
Nevertheless, the shortfall is an institutional matter deserving explanation. The board is intended to offer challenge on strategy, performance and risk management while enormous financial commitments and infrastructure programmes are being undertaken.
Why did the department’s main board fail to meet its minimum governance standard during such an important period?
OFGEM QUESTIONED VALUE FOR MONEY — AND NESO IS STILL EXPANDING
NESO’s audited 2024/25 accounts recorded £773,650 in total remuneration for its chief executive Fintan Slye, including salary, performance-related awards, benefits and pension value. This was not a recurring basic salary figure.
In September 2026, Ofgem assessed NESO’s delivery of value for money as below expectations. It identified shortcomings in evidence of cost optimisation and problems with connections reform.
Ofgem also concluded that NESO continued operating the electricity system safely and reliably, and met expectations overall. The regulator did not conclude that every pound of NESO expenditure was wasteful.
NESO’s May 2026 cost plan forecast £778 million of organisational expenditure for 2026/27. That is different from the much larger electricity-balancing expenditure or capital investment by transmission owners.
Nevertheless, consumers are entitled to demand clear performance measures for public bodies and regulated organisations with such important responsibilities.
DESNZ cannot simply point to NESO’s separate statutory status when asked whether the whole strategy produces value for consumers.
Source: Ofgem NESO performance assessment. NESO audited accounts.
THIS IS NOT SIMPLY MODERNISATION — IT IS A GOVERNMENT-DIRECTED RECONSTRUCTION
The word modernisation is frequently used to describe Britain’s energy transformation. But new infrastructure is not automatically better infrastructure.
A modern system should be judged by dependable power, full-system costs, industrial competitiveness, resilience and efficient use of national resources.
Britain’s inherited electricity system provided power over many decades, but it has required significant maintenance and will continue to need renewal. The government has chosen a particularly extensive reconstruction programme shaped in part by statutory emissions requirements and its 2030 political timetable.
That brings costs extending beyond generation itself: transmission, substations, flexibility, storage, reserve generation, control systems, financing, land use and replacement over the full life of each asset.
The question is not whether Britain can construct new infrastructure. It is whether the selected programme is economically justified compared with an alternative that makes the most effective use of existing assets while providing reliable new generation.
Such an alternative should be tested on equal terms, including nuclear investment, feasible plant-life extensions, domestic fuel supply, grid refurbishment and the ability to reduce or avoid unnecessary reinforcement.
THE SAME POLICY FRAMEWORK, THE SAME INSTITUTIONS — WHERE IS THE INDEPENDENT CHALLENGE?
Jonathan Brearley helped develop the Climate Change Act. He subsequently led Ofgem during substantial regulatory and infrastructure change. He now heads the department responsible for implementing energy policy.
That is a remarkable degree of institutional continuity. It does not prove wrongdoing or mean he personally caused every cost increase, infrastructure decision or energy-market problem.
It does raise a serious question about independent reassessment of the policy itself.
Who within the system is empowered to say that the original assumptions may no longer justify the chosen approach?
Who asks whether changed construction costs or timetable risks require reconsideration? Who tests whether nuclear power, existing dispatchable stations or alternative generating locations could reduce the need for particular transmission routes? Who accounts for the remaining economic life of inherited assets?
A department cannot establish that its preferred programme is the best value simply by asking organisations to model increasingly detailed ways of achieving it. It needs independent comparison with credible alternatives, constructed using comparable technical and financial assumptions.
DESNZ MUST NOW ACCOUNT FOR THE COMPLETE CONSEQUENCES
Britain faces years of substantial electricity infrastructure investment. Household electricity prices have risen sharply. Manufacturers face international disadvantages. Transmission congestion payments are measured in billions. Major construction projects face delays.
The NAO has highlighted the absence of a demonstrated integrated whole-system appraisal for the projects selected. Ofgem has questioned NESO’s evidence of value for money. These are findings from public oversight bodies.
They do not prove that Britain’s electricity system has stopped functioning or that every part of the government’s programme lacks economic value. Government argues that clean generation can reduce reliance on volatile gas prices and improve energy security. Those benefits should be counted, and so should the costs and risks of credible alternatives.
DESNZ should publish a complete, independently verified financial and engineering assessment showing why its chosen transformation is preferable to alternatives based on Britain’s physical energy requirements, viable existing infrastructure, dependable generation and targeted network investment.
It should distinguish policy-driven infrastructure from necessary asset replacement, identify costs borne through bills and taxation, and show who carries the risks when promised connections or construction milestones slip.
THE FINAL QUESTION FOR JONATHAN BREARLEY AND DESNZ
Brearley helped develop the statutory framework shaping Britain’s climate policy. He subsequently headed the energy regulator. He now leads DESNZ.
At the Public Accounts Committee, he accepted the department’s accountability.
That acknowledgement should be followed by the evidence necessary for meaningful public scrutiny.
The country should not be expected to commit vast resources simply because a political objective has already been selected. Nor should additional generation and transmission capacity automatically be presented as progress without demonstrating a positive outcome for consumers and industry.
Progress means dependable electricity, competitive prices, sensible investment and a system capable of supporting Britain’s future economic needs.
The question for DESNZ is no longer simply whether it can deliver the transformation it has chosen.
It is whether the department can demonstrate that the transformation itself represents the right engineering and economic choice for Britain.
That question deserves a complete answer before the country commits still more money, infrastructure and land to the programme.
EVIDENCE AND PRIMARY REFERENCES
Jonathan Brearley — Government Biography
Public Accounts Committee — 22 October 2026
National Audit Office — Upgrading the Electricity Transmission Network
National Audit Office — September 2026 Findings
DESNZ — Annual Report and Accounts 2025/26
DESNZ — Clean Power 2030 Action Plan
Institute for Fiscal Studies — Electricity Prices
UK Steel — October 2026 Industrial Electricity Prices
Ofgem — Energy Debt and Arrears
Ofgem — NESO Performance Assessment
National Grid — Supergrid Engineering History
Evidence note: Financial amounts refer to different years and accounting categories and should not be added together. The £70 billion network investment estimate overlaps with the wider £40 billion annual Clean Power investment figure. Projected future constraint costs are risk estimates, not money already paid. Long-term departmental liability valuations are not current cash expenditures. The PAC quotations are from an available live hearing transcript pending confirmation against its final corrected version.
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