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COULD NET ZERO TRIGGER A CRISIS WORSE THAN 2008? The Debt, the Solar Failures and the Risk to Britain

In 2008, the crisis began with the banks.

What if the next economic crisis begins with the price of energy?

Britain has £5.02 billion in domestic energy debt and arrears. Its electricity infrastructure is entering an era of heavy borrowing. Across Europe, solar and battery businesses have already entered insolvency proceedings in 2026 — including companies financed by major international investment managers.

Could the combination of energy costs, debts, industrial weakness and failing investment projects create economic damage greater than the crash of 2008?

It is a serious risk worth examining. A crisis in the next two or three years is possible, not established or inevitable. Equally, the absence of a proven collapse today is no reason to ignore vulnerabilities building inside a system essential to every household and business.

We have spent the past week following the finances of National Grid, NESO, DESNZ and Ofgem. This Sunday investigation brings together what those findings mean for the wider economy — and adds disturbing evidence from European solar insolvencies.

First, remember the scale of 2008

The financial crisis of 2008 was an acute collapse of trust in the banking system. Credit markets froze, major institutions required support and businesses and families suffered a severe recession.

The Office for National Statistics records that the UK economy contracted by more than 6% between early 2008 and mid-2009, and took around five years to regain its earlier size.

A future energy-related crisis might not resemble a bank run. It could emerge as a prolonged squeeze on disposable incomes, the loss of energy-intensive manufacturing, lower investment and financial losses in highly borrowed infrastructure projects. If those pressures coincided with a credit shock, consequences could spread further.

We must also compare like with like. A £70 billion investment forecast is not £70 billion of taxpayer losses, just as a government guarantee in 2008 was not necessarily a permanent loss of the full guaranteed amount.

The danger is that the country’s ability to produce, invest and earn could be weakened over many years — even without another dramatic banking collapse.

Households: £5.02 billion already owed

Ofgem’s latest published data show £5.02 billion in Great Britain domestic gas and electricity debt and arrears outstanding for more than 91 days at the end of June 2026. That was up from £4.79 billion three months earlier and up 13% from the equivalent quarter in 2025.

The government and Ofgem’s November 2026 energy-debt strategy says more than two million households have energy debt or arrears, with fewer than half on repayment arrangements.

This is not debt caused entirely by Net Zero. The international gas-price shock, inflation, pressure on incomes and debt-collection rules are important factors. But it tells us how limited the financial headroom is for additional charges.

For October to December 2026, Ofgem’s annualised benchmark for a typical dual-fuel direct-debit household is £1,723. That is a standard-consumption comparison, not the amount every customer will pay.

When essential energy costs rise, households cannot simply decide to live without electricity and heating. They cut something else — savings, food, transport, home maintenance or other spending.

That spreads pressure into the wider economy. A financial transition that appears affordable on a spreadsheet may not be affordable for households that already owe money.

Industry: a competitiveness warning, not a claim that every factory has closed

Illustrative image of a large steelworks, representing energy-intensive manufacturing
Energy prices influence whether factories can compete. Steel, glass, chemicals and ceramics are among the industries exposed to high and volatile energy costs. Illustrative image from our existing campaign media library, not a photograph of a named company failure.

The International Energy Agency reports that electricity prices for energy-intensive industry in the European Union averaged more than twice US levels in 2025, and remained substantially above those in China.

Competitive energy is a condition for producing steel, chemicals, glass, ceramics and many other manufactured goods. A business facing persistently higher power costs than an overseas rival may delay investment, move production or close a particular facility.

But an assertion that Western industry has ‘virtually collapsed’ would go further than the data allow. The latest ONS figures released 12 November 2026 show UK manufacturing output rose 0.9% in the third quarter. The issue is industrial vulnerability, erosion in some energy-intensive sectors and the long-term effect of investment decisions.

Nor can every high industrial electricity price be blamed on Net Zero. Wholesale fuel markets, network costs, national taxes, policy levies, market design and individual company circumstances all matter.

Nevertheless, it is legitimate to ask whether government energy policy gives adequate weight to the industries whose competitiveness depends on affordable and dependable power.

Britain cannot rebuild its industrial economy while ignoring the cost of powering it.

Europe’s solar warning: Enerparc and the €1 billion finance announcement

Perhaps the most telling new evidence comes from Germany.

On 12 March 2026, major solar developer Enerparc AG announced a financing package of up to €1 billion to support its growing solar and battery portfolio.

Its company announcement and the advisers’ financing account identify a €500 million holding-company debt platform arranged from funds managed by EIG Partners, Schroders Capital and Eiffel Investment Group, alongside a large senior-financing arrangement with German lender LBBW.

The advisers say 18 funds participated in the €500 million platform financing. This establishes a direct connection between a major solar developer and international investment funds, but it does not identify the ultimate pension members or prove that the full facility had been drawn or lost.

Then, in September 2026, Enerparc AG entered preliminary insolvency proceedings in Hamburg. Reporting has linked its difficulties to substantial leverage and the failure of a separate financing arrangement. The insolvency concerned the parent legal entity; its individual solar project companies and other affiliates were not automatically all bankrupt.

By October, the insolvency administrator was running an investor process to sell parts of the business and its project portfolio. More than 100 potential investors reportedly expressed interest.

Think about the chronology: a billion-euro financing announcement in March, insolvency proceedings six months later.

That does not prove that the €1 billion was lost. It is, however, a clear demonstration of how the growth plans of an apparently well-financed energy business can come under pressure surprisingly quickly.

Illustrative photograph of solar photovoltaic panels; not an Enerparc or GoldenPeaks site
European solar financing is facing a real-world test. This is an illustrative solar photograph, not an image of any company mentioned in the insolvency cases. Photograph: American Public Power Association / Unsplash.

Another European case: GoldenPeaks and its lenders

A second example is GoldenPeaks Poland, associated with solar-power projects in Poland and other European markets.

GoldenPeaks-related companies filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States in May 2026. Reporting on the proceedings described approximately $1.5 billion borrowed for European solar-power projects and disputes between creditors and a major investment manager, Brookfield.

A court later approved a liquidation process involving sales of assets to Brookfield, one of the main lenders. The September 2026 court reporting explains the proposed liquidation and sale process.

The $1.5 billion is a reported borrowing figure, not a verified final loss for investors, taxpayers or pension savers. Creditor recoveries and legal-entity boundaries matter. We should not assume that every investor lost the face value of its commitment.

But this is exactly the sort of structure that makes the financial link worth examining: construction projects, special-purpose companies, creditors, asset managers and a market for the underlying generating assets.

What happens if more projects need to be sold quickly, and there are fewer buyers prepared to pay the valuations used when the money was lent?

Solar and storage firms under strain — but insolvency is not proof the whole sector has failed

There are other examples. German photovoltaic manufacturer Soluxtec filed for insolvency in April 2026, amid price competition, then was acquired and restarted production later in the year. Two companies within German vertical-solar specialist Next2Sun began self-administered insolvency proceedings in October 2026, while other group activities continued.

German home-battery manufacturer Sonnen GmbH, previously owned by Shell, filed for insolvency in October 2026, just months after a change of owner. Its US operations were reported separately and must not be described as automatically insolvent.

These failures have different causes. Manufacturing faces international competition and falling equipment prices; some developers face leverage, financing gaps, project delays or weaker expected returns.

Some assets survive company failures through restructuring, acquisition or continued operation. This is why the count of failed companies alone cannot establish a financial-system collapse.

What the cases do establish is that renewable-energy investment is not automatically low-risk merely because it sits within a government-backed energy transition.

Where pension funds and investment groups enter the picture

Pension and investment capital can reach infrastructure through many routes: directly owned projects, specialist renewable-energy funds, private-credit vehicles, corporate debt, infrastructure bonds and diversified portfolios.

There is nothing inherently irresponsible about pension funds investing in infrastructure. Long-lived power assets may provide cash flows over decades, and pension schemes normally hold diversified investments.

But these structures can also obscure who ultimately bears losses when an investment fails. Some funds borrow in addition to investing capital. Some projects depend on planned future cash flows, regulatory arrangements or refinancing once construction is complete.

In the Enerparc case, the €500 million junior/holding-company debt platform funded by 18 investment funds provides a documented example of professional investment capital supporting solar expansion. It does not establish that UK local-government pension funds invested in Enerparc or that pension beneficiaries have lost money.

To establish pension exposure properly, we would need individual fund holdings, exposure dates, the debt or equity instrument involved, any write-downs and the amounts recovered from insolvency proceedings.

This is exactly the evidence we should ask pension managers and regulators to provide where public retirement savings are involved.

The Bank of England’s July 2026 Financial Stability Report discusses risks in private credit, including leverage, refinancing pressure and the difficulty of understanding some interconnected exposures. About 20% of riskier debt in the markets it examined was due to be refinanced by the end of 2027.

The Bank also reported that UK corporate balance sheets were strong in aggregate, and that the financial system remained resilient. Those findings matter: a possible channel of contagion is not the same as proof that a systemic crisis has begun.

National Grid: why investment and borrowing have to be examined together

National Grid plc’s results for the six months ended September 2026 recorded £48.6 billion in group net debt, an increase of £4.4 billion since March.

The group has announced plans to invest at least £70 billion over five years in its UK and American networks and related businesses. The programme is not solely British transmission spending, nor is all the borrowing linked to solar or wind generation.

National Grid Electricity Transmission, the regulated UK company examined in our earlier series, had £12.773 billion net debt at the end of March 2026. That is part of a group structure: do not add it to the parent company’s consolidated £48.6 billion as though it were extra unrelated debt.

Borrowing for useful long-life infrastructure is normal. The question is whether the assets will be delivered on schedule, financed efficiently and capable of providing the benefits assumed when their cost is approved.

Under regulated network financing, customers can pay for allowed investment over decades through electricity charges. If construction is delayed, costs rise or expected system savings fail to emerge, the eventual consumer outcome can be worse than forecast — though regulatory rules and incentives can also require companies to bear part of the risk.

One of the most important unanswered questions is whether the country’s grid investment programme has been independently stress-tested against simultaneous planning delays, high borrowing costs and weaker-than-forecast electricity demand.

The charges being forecast are substantial

Line chart of NESO's forecast GB transmission system charges for 2026/27 to 2031/32, with NGET component
Transmission charges are forecast to increase. NESO’s October 2026 tariff view. Figures after 2026/27 are forecasts for total GB transmission charges, not a corresponding percentage change in a typical household’s electricity bill. NESO charging publications.

NESO’s October 2026 forecast shows Great Britain Transmission Network Use of System revenue collections rising from £7.611 billion in 2026/27 to a forecast £13.802 billion in 2031/32.

The later figures are forecasts and may change. They describe system-wide charges, not the profit of NESO or NGET, and they do not imply a comparable 81% rise in the average household’s entire electricity bill.

Nevertheless, they show an important source of future cost pressure. Alongside new construction, energy users also fund wholesale power, balancing, distribution, taxes and other costs under separate arrangements.

The public should see one reconciliation that prevents double counting and clearly distinguishes investment announced, money borrowed, money spent and revenue actually collected.

Some reinforcements could reduce system constraints and balancing costs; other projects may be delayed or need redesign. The benefits must be tested as carefully as the costs.

And the Treasury’s borrowing capacity is already under strain

The ONS estimated public sector net debt at £3.005 trillion at the end of September 2026, equivalent to 94.0% of GDP.

That is the government’s accumulated net debt, not the amount borrowed for Net Zero. It cannot be added to National Grid’s corporate debt or household arrears as though these were all government liabilities.

But it constrains choices if another economic shock arrives.

The Office for Budget Responsibility said on 28 October 2026 that higher energy prices and borrowing costs were pushing inflation higher, reducing real incomes and weighing on GDP growth in the following year.

Its forecast scenarios show how sustained energy-price increases could push future government borrowing materially above the central forecast.

The OBR also considers the long-term fiscal costs of both climate change and the transition to Net Zero. Its analysis does not conclude that abandoning the transition would eliminate economic risks: climate damage and continued exposure to fossil-fuel price shocks matter too.

That is why the honest comparison is between different viable energy pathways with complete system costs, not between an expensive policy and an imaginary no-cost alternative.

Could all these pressures combine into a crisis in 2028 or 2029?

Consider a scenario, rather than a forecast.

Energy prices remain high relative to Britain’s industrial competitors. Some infrastructure projects miss their energisation dates, while developers must refinance debt at unattractive rates. A further round of solar or battery insolvencies leads private funds to mark down assets and become more cautious about lending. Meanwhile, household arrears persist and the government has limited room for another large support programme.

Under those conditions, firms might curtail production, cancel investments or move activity abroad. Lenders might tighten terms. Some contractors and suppliers might fail. The repercussions would spread through employment, tax receipts, pensions and the demand for further government assistance.

That is a plausible transmission mechanism, not evidence that each event will occur or that the result will exceed the damage of 2008.

There are also forces working in the other direction: renewable electricity can reduce fuel-import exposure, efficient network investment can lower congestion, diversified pension funds can absorb individual losses, insolvency can transfer assets to stronger owners, and banks are better capitalised than before the 2008 crisis.

Whether a crisis becomes systemic depends on the scale of losses, concentrations of exposure, liquidity and the resilience of the wider economy. No reliable evidence currently allows us to assign an honest probability to a ‘worse than 2008’ outcome within two or three years.

But uncertainty is a reason to conduct the stress test — not to assume the risk away.

What the government and regulators should publish now

We need a transparent national account of the energy programme: actual capital spending rather than just announcements; the borrowing and refinancing timetable of major projects; realistic connection and commissioning dates; and the regulated income streams that investors expect consumers to support.

We need independent project-level assessment of cost overruns, cancellation risks and what happens to electricity prices if new network assets arrive late or assumed benefits are lower than forecast.

We also need an examination of exposure through pension funds, infrastructure funds and private credit — based on verifiable holdings and loan structures, not assumptions that every investment manager is secretly using British pensions.

Above all, the UK should compare a genuinely deliverable, affordable energy system with the current policy pathway on the same terms: reliable output, industrial competitiveness, household costs, financing, asset life and resilience.

That is a stronger test than simply declaring every renewable project either successful or a failure before it has been built.

The warning Britain should not ignore

The 2008 crash demonstrated what can happen when the financial system builds obligations on assumptions that later prove unsafe.

Britain’s energy transition is a different undertaking, and it offers possible benefits as well as risks. But the combination of large borrowing requirements, household hardship, industrial price pressure and real European solar insolvencies makes the case for independent financial scrutiny unavoidable.

We cannot yet conclude that Net Zero will cause a crisis worse than 2008. We can conclude that the potential consequences of getting the investment, financing and delivery assumptions wrong are too serious to leave untested.

The country should not be asked to accept promises of long-term savings without a clear account of the short-term costs, the financial exposures, and what happens when projects or companies fail.

Make them show the evidence — before the debts and commitments become a burden the country cannot easily escape.

Shane Oxer — Campaigner for fairer and affordable energy

Sources and evidence notes

  1. ONS, The 2008 recession ten years on.
  2. Ofgem, GB domestic energy debt and arrears data, Q2 2026.
  3. DESNZ and Ofgem, November 2026 energy-debt strategy.
  4. IEA, Electricity 2026, industrial electricity prices; ONS, GDP Q3 2026.
  5. Enerparc, March 2026 financing announcement; Simmons & Simmons, 18-fund debt platform; pv magazine, September 2026 insolvency proceedings.
  6. Bloomberg Law, GoldenPeaks bankruptcy filing, May 2026; Bloomberg Law, September 2026 liquidation approval.
  7. pv magazine, Soluxtec insolvency; Soluxtec restart; Next2Sun proceedings; Sonnen insolvency.
  8. Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, July 2026, private-credit risks and system resilience.
  9. National Grid plc, Half-Year Results 2026/27, debt and investment forecasts; NGET, Annual Report and Accounts 2025/26.
  10. NESO, October 2026 transmission charge five-year view.
  11. ONS, Public sector finances, September 2026; OBR, October 2026 outlook.

Evidence note: This is a scenario-based investigation of financial risk, not a forecast of a certain recession in 2028–29. Public debt, corporate net debt, consumer arrears, investment commitments, project borrowing and pension-fund allocations are different accounting categories and must not be added. Corporate insolvency does not necessarily mean closure of operating solar assets or complete loss to creditors. The European cases do not establish UK pension losses. Increases in electricity costs have multiple causes, and comparing transition options requires accounting for potential benefits and avoided fuel-price exposure as well as investment risk.