
Our 2019–2026 shelf-price investigation exposes the real cost of food: higher prices, smaller packs, disappearing promotions and collapsing branded sales volumes
Forget the comforting averages. Forget carefully selected comparison periods that begin after prices had already started moving. If we want to understand what has happened to the cost of food in Britain, we should begin with something much simpler: what did an actual product cost before 2020, how much did we receive, and what does that same quantity cost in 2026?
That is what this investigation does.
It does not use a government food-price index. It compares documented 2019 shelf prices with retailer prices checked on 31 August 2026. Standard prices are separated from loyalty offers and promotions. Where packaging has shrunk, the comparison is made by weight rather than by the price printed on the box.
The conclusion is stark: many households are not paying 20% or 30% more for everyday food. Across the products examined, the real increases frequently reach 50%, 60%, 70% or more.
A basic food basket has risen by 55%
An “independent Tesco superstore investigation conducted in July 2019” (https://www.lovemoney.com/news/86638/tesco-metro-sainsburys-local-aldi-convenience-store-essentials) recorded the prices of ordinary household staples. Comparing those products with their current equivalents gives us a much clearer picture of what has happened.
Product| July 2019| August 2026| Increase
Four pints of semi-skimmed milk| £1.09| “£1.75” (https://www.tesco.com/shop/en-GB/products/254656543)| 60.6%
Warburtons Farmhouse bread, 800g| £1.35| “£1.65” (https://www.tesco.com/shop/en-GB/products/250168194)| 22.2%
Clover Original spread, 500g| £1.85| “£2.60” (https://www.tesco.com/shop/en-GB/products/254263685)| 40.5%
Tesco wholewheat fusilli, 500g| £0.55| “£0.75” (https://www.tesco.com/shop/en-GB/products/254878614)| 36.4%
Six medium free-range eggs| £0.85| “£1.80” (https://www.tesco.com/shop/en-GB/products/250802613)| 111.8%
Orange juice with bits, one litre| £1.10| “£2.00” (https://www.tesco.com/shop/en-GB/products/258997144)| 81.8%
Total| £6.79| £10.55| 55.4%
These are not luxury products. They are milk, bread, spread, pasta, eggs and juice.
The same small basket that cost £6.79 in 2019 now costs £10.55. That is an increase of 55.4%.
The public’s recollection that four pints of milk once cost around £1 is correct. The documented major-supermarket price in 2019 was £1.09. Today it is £1.75. Anyone who remembers paying 99p or £1 through an earlier price cut has experienced an increase of approximately 75%.
Bread is more variable. The identical-sized Warburtons loaf examined here increased by 22.2%. But there is an important mathematical trap in how price changes are discussed. If an old price was one-third lower than today’s price, today’s price is not one-third higher—it is 50% higher than the old price.
Meat tells an even more disturbing story
In September 2019, Aldi offered one kilogram of British Red Tractor chicken breast for “£3.99” (https://www.thesun.co.uk/money/9869841/aldis-massive-1kg-chicken-breasts-feed-family-six/). A comparable one-kilogram product is now “£6.69” (https://www.aldi.co.uk/product/ashfields-chicken-breast-fillets-000000000000387924), an increase of 67.7%. The 2019 product was a Specialbuy, so it should be treated as a promotional comparison, but it remains a genuine price shoppers could pay.
Aldi British beef mince containing 5% fat was documented at “£2.85 for 500g in December 2019” (https://www.lovemoney.com/news/91267/how-ms-remarksable-deals-costs-tesco-aldi-waitrose-cheapest). The comparable product is now “£5.05” (https://www.aldi.co.uk/product/ashfields-british-lean-beef-steak-mince-5-fat-000000000000575278), an increase of 77.2%.
Together, those two meat purchases have risen from £6.84 to £11.74—an increase of 71.6%.
If a household bought the six basic products and these two meat products once a week, its cost would have risen from £13.63 to £22.29. That is 63.5% more, equivalent to an additional £8.66 a week or approximately £450 a year.
That is not being presented as the average British household shop. It is something more transparent: a controlled illustration using identifiable products and real shelf prices.
Established brands have pushed prices far beyond many household budgets
The most severe increases appear among established brands that once formed part of the ordinary family cupboard.
A 415g can of Heinz Beanz averaged “82p across major supermarkets in 2019” (https://www.thegrocer.co.uk/analysis-and-features/baked-beans-prices-on-the-rise-in-major-supermarkets/598217.article). The standard Tesco price is now “£1.40” (https://www.tesco.com/shop/en-GB/products/252261477), an increase of 70.7%.
A 400g can of Heinz Cream of Tomato Soup was selling for “around 95p in January 2019” (https://www.thegrocer.co.uk/news/heinz-pours-core-soups-into-microwaveable-pot/575382.article). It is now “£1.59” (https://www.tesco.com/shop/en-GB/products/258147391), approximately 67% more.
The earliest sufficiently robust published comparison found for the exact 460g Heinz Ketchup format begins in October 2020, when the six-retailer average was £1.74. The current Tesco price is “£3.30” (https://www.tesco.com/shop/en-GB/products/250167878). Although it cannot be included in a strict 2019 comparison, that still represents an extraordinary 89.7% increase since 2020.
Consumers are increasingly required to join loyalty schemes or buy several units to avoid the full standard price. Tesco currently offers two Heinz Beanz cans for £2 to Clubcard holders, reducing the individual price to £1. But that requires membership and the purchase of two cans. It should not be confused with the universally available shelf price.
This distinction matters because promotional inflation has become part of the household food crisis.
In December 2019, a 350g block of Cathedral City cheese was promoted at Asda for “£2” (https://www.thegrocer.co.uk/news/deep-deals-at-retailers-devaluing-cheddar-category-says-ornua/600377.article). The comparable Tesco product is now £3.50, or £3 with a Clubcard.
From the old £2 promotional price, the current loyalty price is 50% higher, while the standard shelf price is 75% higher. Yet Tesco’s standard price for the same product was already £3.50 in 2019.
The cheese itself has not risen standard-price to standard-price at Tesco. What has changed is the depth and accessibility of the deal. That is not imaginary inflation. For households that bought branded cheese only when it was heavily discounted, it is a genuine increase in the price they actually pay.
Shrinkflation: the increase hidden inside the box
Shelf prices reveal only part of the damage. Manufacturers have also reduced the quantity inside familiar packaging.
Kellogg’s Corn Flakes provides a particularly clear example. In early 2019, its standard box was reduced from 790g to 720g while retaining the same £2.69 recommended price. “The reduction was documented at the time” (https://www.thesun.co.uk/money/8661117/kellogs-cuts-size-cereal-boxes-same-price/).
The corresponding box has since fallen again to 670g and now costs “£3.55” (https://www.tesco.com/shop/en-GB/products/317048228).
Looking only at the checkout price suggests an increase of 32%. But the consumer is also receiving 120g less cereal than before the 2019 reduction.
Measured properly, the price has moved from approximately 34.1p to 53p per 100g. The true unit-price increase is therefore 55.6%.
That is nearly 24 percentage points more than the increase visible on the price label.
This is not an isolated case. Which? documented McVitie’s Digestives falling from 400g to 360g, Penguin and Club multipacks dropping from eight bars to seven, Magnum ice creams shrinking from 110ml to 100ml and Pringles tubes falling from 200g to 185g. “The documented reductions can be examined here” (https://www.which.co.uk/news/article/shrinkflation-on-the-rise-which-reveals-the-items-that-have-shrunk-in-size-but-not-in-price-az2376B4mj5T).
At an unchanged shelf price, those reductions increase the true cost per unit by approximately 11.1%, 14.3%, 10% and 8.1% respectively.
A product becoming 10% smaller does not mean its unit price has risen by only 10%. It means the remaining product is 11.1% more expensive per gram. That difference is routinely missed.
By 2025, a Quality Street tub had fallen from 600g to 550g while its Morrisons price rose from £6 to £7. Which? calculated that this produced a “27% increase per 100g” (https://www.which.co.uk/news/article/shrinkflation-the-brands-charging-you-more-for-less-atUkT4m2GjuP).
Consumers are being hit twice: once by the higher price and again by the missing product.
Households are rejecting the branded premium
The price gap between an established brand and its own-label competitor now explains why branded sales volumes are falling.
A standard 415g can of Heinz Beanz costs £1.40, equivalent to £3.37 per kilogram. Aldi’s comparable 410g Bramwells beans cost “39p” (https://www.aldi.co.uk/product/bramwells-baked-beans-in-a-rich-tomato-sauce-000000000000541364), equivalent to approximately 95p per kilogram.
Heinz is therefore around 255% more expensive per kilogram.
Even after Tesco’s two-for-£2 Clubcard promotion, Heinz remains approximately 153% more expensive per kilogram than Aldi’s alternative.
Consumers have not suddenly stopped needing inexpensive food. Many have simply stopped paying three-and-a-half times as much for a famous label.
The effect can be seen in Heinz’s UK results. Its sales volume fell by 5% in 2022 and another 12% in 2023, according to accounts reported by “The Grocer” (https://www.thegrocer.co.uk/news/heinz-volumes-tumble-as-shoppers-seek-cheaper-alternatives/695367.article). Volume fell another 0.3% in 2024, while UK sales declined from £967.1 million to £952.7 million. In 2025, sales fell again by 4.2% to £913 million, primarily because volume declined by a further 3.8%.
If those annual volume movements are chained together, Heinz’s UK volume appears to have been approximately 20% lower at the end of 2025 than in 2021. That is a calculated indication rather than a company-published cumulative figure, but the direction is unmistakable.
Higher prices helped protect revenue while fewer physical units were sold. That is why revenue alone gives an incomplete and potentially misleading picture.
The established brands may still appear financially resilient, but many are being slowly priced out of the family shopping basket.
The retreat from British manufacturing
Falling UK sales do not automatically prove that a British factory is producing less. Products can be exported, imported, transferred between factories or held in stock. Sales volume, company revenue and physical factory output are different measurements and should never be casually merged.
Nevertheless, what happened at Heinz is significant.
In 2021, Kraft Heinz announced a proposed £140 million investment at its Kitt Green factory in Wigan. It was intended to modernise the plant, create jobs and return the production of ketchup, mayonnaise and salad cream to Britain for the first time since 1999.
That investment did not happen.
In March 2022, Kraft Heinz cancelled the Wigan proposal and redirected the money to facilities in Spain and Poland. “The original manufacturing report now carries the cancellation update” (https://zenoot.com/2021/06/02/kraft-heinz-to-invest-140m-at-wigan-site/).
This does not prove that production of the beans, soups and pasta already manufactured at Wigan has fallen. Kraft Heinz stated in 2024 that Kitt Green continued to produce approximately 250,000 tonnes of food annually and employed around 850 people.
But Britain unquestionably lost a major manufacturing investment, additional production lines and the opportunity to bring famous Heinz sauces back home.
That is not a theoretical loss. It is investment, technology, production capacity and employment that went elsewhere.
The wider warning can be seen at Kellogg’s. Kellanova is closing its historic Trafford Park cereal factory by the end of 2026, affecting around 360 jobs. The company said only half the site was being used and that the investment required to modernise it was no longer viable. Its Wrexham operation continues, meaning the closure cannot automatically be counted as an equivalent reduction in total British cereal output. But it is undeniably another contraction of Britain’s established food-manufacturing footprint.
Britain is paying more while receiving less
The evidence exposes a food crisis far deeper than a headline inflation percentage.
A controlled group of ordinary staple foods has risen by 55.4% since 2019. Two comparable meat purchases have risen by 71.6%. Heinz Beanz and soup have risen by approximately 67–71%. Heinz Ketchup is nearly 90% more expensive than its 2020 average. Kellogg’s Corn Flakes have risen by 55.6% per gram once the disappearing cereal is included.
At the same time, loyalty schemes and multibuy offers increasingly determine who can avoid the highest shelf price. Familiar packets are becoming smaller. Some recipes are being weakened. Shoppers are abandoning established brands for own-label alternatives, and branded sales volumes are falling.
Then comes the final blow: promised British manufacturing investment is redirected overseas while long-established factories close or consolidate.
This is not simply food inflation. It is a steady erosion of value.
Families pay more. They receive less. Famous brands lose customers. British production opportunities disappear. Yet the public is repeatedly presented with averages that fail to capture what has happened to the actual products placed in an actual shopping basket.
We need a more honest measure of food costs—one that records standard prices separately from loyalty prices, calculates every change per 100g or 100ml, exposes pack reductions and distinguishes sales revenue from the number of products being sold.
Manufacturers should be required to display previous pack sizes when products shrink. Retailers should make unit prices prominent and consistent. Established food companies should disclose UK sales volumes separately from UK factory output so that lost domestic production cannot be hidden behind rising prices or multinational accounts.
Britain cannot build food security by pricing families out of familiar products, shrinking what remains and allowing manufacturing investment to move abroad.
The evidence is now clear. Since 2019, millions of households have not merely been paying more for food.
They have been paying substantially more for substantially less.
Shane Oxer. Campaigner for fairer and affordable energy

Leave a comment